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Abstract
Two models of opinion dynamics are entangled in order to build a
more realistic model of inflexibility. The first one is the Galam Unifying
Frame (GUF), which incorporates rational and inflexible agents, and the
other one considers the combination of Continuous Opinions and Discrete
Actions (CODA). While initially in GUF, inflexibility is a fixed given
feature of an agent, it is now the result of an accumulation for a given agent
who makes the same choice through repeated updates. Inflexibility thus
emerges as an internal property of agents becoming a continuous function
of the strength of its opinion. Therefore an agent can be more or less
inflexible and can shift from inflexibility along one choice to inflexibility
along the opposite choice. These individual dynamics of the building up
and falling off of an agent inflexibility are driven by the successive local
updates of the associated individual opinions. New results are obtained
and discussed in terms of predicting outcomes of public debates.
1 Introduction
Most models of opinion dynamics use local rules of opinion updates to monitor
the dynamics of individual agents [1]. The agents are often identical and can
shift opinion as a function of the chosen update rule. Indeed many models are
based on the sole existence of an update rule which is legitimated by the psycho-
sociological interpretation of the rule. For instance the Sznajd model evokes the
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postulated principle ”United we Stand, Divided we Fall” [2, 3] while Galammod-
els consider the democratic principle ”one person one vote” [4]. However such
an approach can be misleading precisely with respect to the psycho-sociological
consequences of selecting a model. It has been shown that all discrete models,
i.e., different claimed psycho-sociological mechanisms, are indeed identical and
can be mapped to the Galam Unifying Frame (GUF) [5]. They can also be
obtained as limit cases [6] of a generalized Continuous Opinions and Discrete
Actions (CODA) model [7, 8] .
More recently a good deal of works has been devoted to the incorporation of
different types of agents considering heterogeneous agents [9]. For instance, the
effect of contrarian agents who always oppose the majority choice, either local
or global was studied [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. A small proportion of these
contrarian agents were shown to drive a total upside down of the dynamics from
a threshold dynamics onto a threshold-less dynamics with a unique attractor
located at exactly fifty-fifty. This feature was used to explain the so called
hung elections, a new phenomenon repeatedly observed in the last ten years in
democratic societies [10].
In addition, the effect of inflexible agents who never shift opinion have been
also investigated. The idea is to account for the fact that in the real social
world some agents are observed to be strongly opinionated individuals who
do not change opinion whatever opposite argument is given to them. Indeed,
they can play a very important role in a public debates. By simply holding
to their opinions when meeting different people in various discussing groups,
they can cause a minority to slowly increase in size until it becomes a majority
and eventually wins the debate. This effect was shown in models of opinion
dynamics using inflexible agents [18]. Inflexibility is found to produce a series
of unexpected and disturbing results. Depending on the respective proportions
of inflexibles at each side of a debate, even a very small minority could convince
the whole population about its opinion [19].
Such a feature of agents holding to their opinion against exchanges with
others holding the opposite opinion has been introduced first twenty years ago
using local individual fields in the modeling of group decision making within the
frame of magnetic like models [20]. Opinion dynamics since, has been the subject
of numerous works where some sort of inflebility or extremism was introduced
and its effects studied [1, 21, 22, 23, 5, 24, 19, 18, 7, 8, 25].
Nevertheless, it is worth to emphasize that when heterogeneous agents have
been incorporated in a model their respective proportions were kept fixed during
the dynamics process of emergence of a collective opinion. Accordingly the
composition of the system in terms of the various types of agents is given as
an external parameter. It is part of the initial condition in the problem. Once
the debate is turned on, no rational individuals would become inflexibles, nor
inflexibles have a chance of eventually getting convinced they were wrong and in
turn shift opinion as it is sometimes observed in the reality. We denote rationals
the corresponding agents who do hold an opinion but are susceptible to shift to
another one while discussing with others provided enough convincing arguments
are given.
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In this paper we extend the notion of inflexibility by incorporating the CODA
formalism [7, 8, 26, 27, 6], where discrete choices are associated with a strength
of the associated opinion. That way, an inflexible can be defined as just someone
who has a very strong opinion, which could be the result of many interactions
with agents holding the same opinion. It thus becomes difficult to have this
agent to shift its own opinion. Accordingly, inflexibility becomes the result of
an internal dynamics of the system which is associated to a given individual.
Simultaneously the reverse process holds true. An inflexible agent can have
its stubbornness more and more weakened making it a rational agent. Also an
inflexible agent can progressively move from inflexibility along one opinion along
inflexibility along the opposite opinion. Yet, total inflexibility can be introduced
with no difficulty, requiring just that their opinion require a large multiple of
the number of allowed interactions for each individual. That way, the dynamics
will stop before the inflexibles would actually change their points of view.
2 Model
Inflexibles were originally introduced as individuals who were so sure of them-
selves that their opinion would not change, regardless of social influence [9, 18].
It makes sense, however, that, given enough time and social pressure, even an
inflexible could, in principle, become a floater, with a softer view and capable
of being convinced. On the other hand, people who were not so convinced at
first could have their own opinions strengthened to the point of being considered
inflexibles.
The changing of status between floaters and inflexibles can be introduced
if we use the Continuous Opinions and Discrete Actions (CODA) model [7, 8]
as basis. In the CODA model, an underlying and non-observable continuous
opinion was used to measure how certain each agent was about its decision
on which of two options it preferred. That means an agent can have an inner
opinion that makes it easy for its choice to change and be a floater. Or the
agent could have a very strong opinion, requiring many interactions before any
change could be observed in its current opinion, making the agent basically
an inflexible. Therefore, we will use the CODA model in order to explore in
more depth the possible consequences of the existence of inflexibles among the
initial debaters in a public issue. This will extend the previous results by Galam
[18] to include the possibility that inflexibles can eventually become floater and
vice-versa.
In the model, N agents will be left to interact freely with each other, with
no network structure assumed. Each agent i has a strength of opinion νi, such
that the spin choice associated with νi will be given by σi = sign(νi). In the
original CODA model, when one agent observed in instant t a neighbor with
choice σj = ±1, the agent opinion was updated by
νi(t+ 1) = νi(t) + σj(t).
This could mean a change of the observed opinion σi, whenever νi changed sign.
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Following GUF treatment, one group of s agents are randomly drawn at
each time step, forming a debate group. Unlike the treatments by Galam, the
whole population is not divided at each interation step, but only one group is
formed. That way, some agents will, in a given simulation, interact more with
their peers than others. That is probably closer to how society conducts real
debates. Time can be measured as the average number of debates an agent has
participated in.
In the original model from Galam, everyone who is not an inflexible, adopts
the opinion of the observed majority in the group, when the group interacts.
Applying the CODA formalism to GUF interactions is simple. Inside a group
of size s, the agent will observe s− 1 different agents and we can use a CODA
for each other member of the group. While a reasonable proposal, this raises an
important question, when comparing with GUF. In GUF, it was the majority
that drove the dynamics. And in any majority, the opinion of the agent itself
counts. Take, per example, a group of size s = 4. When there is a tie, what
each agent observes is another agent who agrees with him and two other who
disagree. By only observing others, there is a majority against its opinion. This
will only be a tie if the agent also uses its own opinion in the updating process.
In this paper, we will consider that ties have no influence when they happen,
with no bias towards one of the options introduced, i.e., at a tie agents keep
their respective current opinions.
However, it is not clear whether the agent should actually take its own
opinion in the balance for an eventual update. Its own opinion is not a new
information, so, in principle, it should only matter as prior knowledge, not as
new data. But majority rule model do include the opinion of the agent since
the agent does count for the majority. Also, psychological literature suggests
that people do change their mind slowly when facing new information[28, 29],
suggesting it might be a good idea to have a model when the own opinion of the
agent is counted for the updating. Since this issue is possibly open to debate,
we will study both options here, with and without self influence. That is, when
a group of size s is formed, an agent i will update νi according to
νi(t+ 1) = νi(t) + p−m, (1)
where p (number of pluses) is the number of agents in the group with σj = +1
and m (number of minuses) is the number of agents with σj = −1. Depending
on the case, the agent opinion will be counted towards p and m or not.
We should also notice that in discrete models, the outcome of any meetings
of the group is that everyone who is not an inflexible is convinced by the group.
Here, however, agents are only inflexibles in the sense that they may have a
strong opinion. They change their minds when an update from Equation (1)
changes the sign of νi, which will be harder for some agents and easier for
others. That introduces a new question. When a group meets and agreement is
not reached between its members, it is natural, under some circumstances, that
the debate will go on a little longer. Therefore, we need to introduce another
parameter M , to measure the maximum number of interactions (debates) each
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group will agree to keep discussing before they agree to disagree. Obviously,
if there is no limit and M is effectively infinite, all debates end in agreement
(unless real inflexibles are introduced) regardless of strength of opinions and
we recover the discrete case. This can be seen as another example of how
traditional discrete models can be understood as limit cases of Bayesian inspired
models [27, 6]. Here, we will only explore cases where M is fixed and equal for
all agents. That means that for the same group being updated, M successive
updates are performed before putting back the agents in the whole population,
unless consensus is reached first.
3 Results
Following the GUF treatment of the problem, the system was implemented
by randomly drawing groups of size g from the population of size n. However,
here, it is not the whole population that is divided, just groups randomly drawn,
allowing some agents to interact more often than others by chance. In order to
measure time, we use the average number of groups each agent will participate,
that is T is increased of one each time N groups divided by the group size
have interacted. Once a group is randomly drawn, the opinions of each member
change according to the dynamics explained in the previous Section. Both the
case where the self opinion counts and doesn’t count were implemented.
In the GUF treatment, with discrete opinions, a group of inflexibles were
able to change the opinion of the majority when the population had to choose
between two competing ideas, A or B (corresponding to σ = +1 and σ = −1
respectively). By checking what happens under a different model, not only plan
to learn about the models, but also investigate the robustness of the result that
the existence of inflexibles can change a majority of initial supporters for one
of the ideas. Each simulation is performed with initial conditions such that
there is a probability pA that each agent will support A. Normal agents start
with |ν| = 0.5 so that one interaction can convince them to change their options.
However, if an agent supports A (or B) , there is a probability IA (and a possibly
different IB) that it is a weak version of an inflexible, that is, its initial opinion
will be reinforced by a large amount E. If E is an integer, it corresponds to the
number of interactions with disagreeing majorities an agent must have before
changing its choice.
3.1 Size 3 groups
For the simulation results shown here, unless otherwise mentioned, we have
taken E = 50. That makes the agents reasonably inflexible, but not as much
as to completely prevent them from changing their decisions over the course of
many interactions.
Figure (1) shows the distribution of the strength of opinions, measured by νs,
for groups of size 3, with no initial inflexibles supporting B and initial minority
support in favor of A, pA = 30%. In those runs, interactions were stopped after
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Figure 1: Distribution of opinions for different amounts of inflexibles in favor
of A. All simulations started with just a minority supporting A, pA = 30% and
correspond to groups of size 3, where the agents are influenced by their own
opinion and only one round of debates happen (M = 1). In all cases, we had
N = 10, 000 agents and 500, 000 random groups were formed. The upper left
distribution corresponds to IA = 0.4; the upper right, to IA = 0.6; lower left,
IA = 0.8; and lower right to IA = 0.95.
just M = 1 attempt at convincing others and the agent own opinion influences
itself. What we see is that if there are not many initial inflexibles supporting
A, agreement is reached after a while. Even for IA = 40%, the inflexibles are
eventually convinced. They are still very distinguishable, forming a second peak
with weaker opinions (smaller |ν| but all agents prefer B (ν < 0). As IA grows,
however, the peak is able to survive. For IA = 60%, we still see inflexibles
being slowly convinced by the majority, but this effect almost disappears when
IA = 80%. For IA = 95%, it is clear that the inflexible peak has moved to
the right, with most of its members having an opinion close to ν = 100, after
starting around 50. That is, both groups are able to reinforce their own point
of views, meaning they should survive even in extremely long runs, where their
opinions will just keep getting stronger.
Figure (2) shows similar results when the proportion of supporters for A
is still a minority, but a little larger, pA = 40%. In this case, as expected, a
smaller proportion of inflexibles is enough to keep the inflexible peak alive. If
IA = 20%, agreement still happens; at IA = 30%, we still see a few inflexibles
being convinced and it is not clear how much of the inflexible peak would survive
in a very long run. But as IA = 40%, the inflexible peak is clearly reinforcing
itself.
We see that under some circumstances, inflexibles can survive by their own
influence. In the cases abover, however, they were not observed to be capable
of convincing the whole population about their cause, contrary to the results
observed in the GUF treatment. What we see here is that, since normal agents
get their positions reinforced with each interaction, their opinions eventually
become as strong as those of the initial inflexibles and that prevents their group
from being convinced by the inflexible initially strong position. Notice that,
since self-reinforcement does happen, there is a very strong tendency for ev-
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Figure 2: Distribution of opinions for different amounts of inflexibles in favor
of A. The figures correspond to the same configuration as in Figure 1, with
N = 10, 000, M = 1, and 500, 000 groups of size 3 formed. The difference is
that the initial minority supporting A is now pA = 40%. The left distribution
corresponds to IA = 0.2; central one, to IA = 0.3; and the right one to IA = 0.4.
eryone to reinforce their views. With just 3 people per group and their own
voting counting, only when the other two disagree with the agent will it have
its opinion not reinforced. When the other two disagree, the own agent opinion
sets the tie in favor of what it already thought, meaning that it really should
be expected that agents would tend to keep their initial positions under these
circumstances. And, since M = 1, the opinion can be changed by at most 1 and
that is not enough for the inflexibles to turn the decision.
In the discrete case of GUF, given the right initial parameters, the majority
always convinced the minority. In order to get closer to that result, it makes
sense to make M larger so that, if the minority agent is not convinced at first,
debates go on for a while, allowing for stronger influence effects. Results for
different values of M can be seen in Figure (3). There we see that, for M = 1,
even for larger proportions of IA, the population never shifts to a belief in A,
that would be represented by the white color. For small IA and pA (down left at
each graphic), obviously, the whole population gets convinced that B is the best
option (represented by the red color in the graphics). As both inflexibles and
initial supporters of A become more common, we can see that, even for M = 1,
it is no longer possible for the majority supporting B to convince everyone. But
the minority also fails to convince the majority.
The behavior is clearly different when M = 5 or 9. For larger values of
M , an white area appears, meaning that the initial majority of B supporters is
convinced by the inflexibles and the system is changed into an agreement where
everyone actually chooses A. It is important to notice, since the Figure shows
values that are averaged over 20 realizations, that the large region where both
supporters of A and B (especially M = 1 and IB = 0) are observed corresponds
to actual coexistence of both choices in each run and not different final results
where each realization would have ended with al agentsl in favor of a single, but
each time different, choice.
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Figure 3: Average over 20 realizations of the final proportion of agents sup-
porting A for different values of the parameters, as a function of both pA and
IA, where the agent is influenced by its own opinion. Red correspond to a final
state where all agents chose B and white, to A being chosen by all; tones of
yellow show the intermediary cases. The top line figures correspond to M = 1,
the middle one, to M = 5, and the bottom one to M = 9. Left most figures
show results where IB = 0, and the right ones, to IB = 10%
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Figure 4: Proportion of runs after 50 realizations that ended with full agreement
in favor of A as a function of IA. In all realziations, initially, there was a 40%
proportion of A supporters. The graphic at the left corresponds to M = 1 and
the one at right to M = 5.
3.1.1 The agent self-exclusion case
It makes sense now to inquire what happens if the agent does not count itself
towards the majority. We have then that a few differences in the behavior of
the system can be observed when no self interaction is allowed. In that case, the
opinion of the rest of the individuals has a much better chance to influence the
agent and we see that, after a while, agreement was observed in all realizations
of the model. The important question that remains is to identify how likely it
is for a system to end up supporting A or B.
Simulations to answer how much the initial inflexibles can have in an influ-
ence in this scenario are shown in Figure(4). Each point there corresponds to
a proportion obtained over 50 realizations; the left panel shows what happens
when agents interact only once in each debate (M = 1), the right panel shows
the results when they try up to five rounds of debates before giving up the
attempt to come to an agreement (M = 5). We can see that in both cases the
inflexibles can turn the tide of a majority in favor of A (initial pA was 40% in
both cases). Even forM = 1, it is now possible for a strong minority to convince
the majority of their point of view. The observed continuous curve can be an
effect of finite size conditions. What we observe is that if the groups are more
insistent in reaching some agreement, the influence of the inflexibles grow, as
less of them are required to convince the whole population about their claim. It
is interesting to remember that the limit M →∞ leads us to the discrete case.
The average results for the same condition (no self interaction in groups of
size 3) can also be seen in Figure (5). It is clear to see the regions where agree-
ment is reached (red for B and white for A), as well as the transition regions,
where different runs ended with agreements for A or B, with the proportions
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Figure 5: Average over 20 realizations of the final proportion of agents support-
ing A for different values of the parameters, as a function of both pA and IA,
where the agent is not influenced by its own opinion. Red correspond to a final
state where all agents chose B and white, to A being chosen by all; tones of
yellow show the intermediary cases. The top line figures correspond to M = 1
and the bottom one to M = 5. Left most figures show results where IB = 1%,
and the right ones, to IB = 10%
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represented by the different tones of orange and yellow between red and white.
As a check of consistency, small amounts of inflexibles in favor of B were intro-
duced, with the expected result that they make it harder for the inflexibles in
favor of A to convince the whole population.
3.2 Size 4 groups
All results presented so far were for groups of size 3. Of course, people can
debate in larger groups and it is worth exploring the differences this may in-
troduce. Therefore, in this Subsection, we study groups with 4 people in each.
Simulations were run for different values of all the major variables (pA, IA, IB ,
and M), for both the case with self influence and the one without it.
The results for the case with self influence can be seen in Figure (6). The
most obvious feature is that inflexibles find it hard to convince the opposing
majority, even when there are no initial inflexibles at the other side of the
debate (left column). When debate is just one interaction (M = 1), only as
both pA gets close to 50% and IA gets close to 1, we see a significant portion of
population not getting completely convinced by the initial majority. As people
try harder to convince each other (both for M = 5 and M = 9), the influence of
the initial inflexibles become clearer with the appearance of a clear region where
the existence of inflexibles only at the side of A can make an initial majority in
favor of B disappear. Qualitatively, the situation is similar to the one observed
for groups of size 3, altough it is required more inflexibles to have a significant
effect. The other two columns show that when we have an important amount
of inflexibles defending also B, they are capable of keeping the victory for the
initial majority, as it should be expected.
The same analysis for the case where the agent is not influenced by its
own opinion is shown in Figure (7). It is interesting to notice that the results
are quite different from those where self influenced happened. While M seems
not to be far less important here, inflexibles do play a much stronger role in
determining the winning side. We can see clearly the effect of increasing IA
and how it allows for A to win for increasingly smaller values of pA. As long as
inflexibles exist at only one side, their effects, in this case, are very important
as for the discrete case.
4 Conclusions
GUF results have demonstrated that inflexibles have a major effect in deter-
mining the winning side of a public debate. However the state of indefinite
inflexible could sound not realistic for most agents making those results frag-
ile. In this work, we have shown that even a more realistic consideration of
inflexibility, making it an accumulative reversible feature, preserved the major
results obtained from the discrete model, at least qualitatively. Accordingly the
drastic effect of inflexibility seems to a be a rather robust ingredient of social
debates. Here, we were able to estimate the effect of inflexible tuning the local
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Figure 6: Average over 20 realizations of the final proportion of agents support-
ing A for different values of the parameters, as a function of both pA and IA,
where the agent is influenced by its own opinion. Red correspond to a final state
where all agents chose B and white, to A being chosen by all; tones of yellow
show the intermediary cases. The top line figures correspond to M = 1, the
middle one to M = 5, and the bottom one to M = 9. Left most figures show
results where IB = 0, central ones correspond to IB = 50%, and the right ones,
to IB = 100%
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Figure 7: Average over20 realizations of the final proportion of agents supporting
A for different values of the parameters, as a function of both pA and IA, where
the agent is not influenced by its own opinion. Red correspond to a final state
where all agents chose B and white, to A being chosen by all; tones of yellow
show the intermediary cases. The top line figures correspond to M = 1, the
middle one, to M = 5, and the bottom one to M = 9. Left most figures show
results where IB = 0, central ones correspond to IB = 50%, and the right ones,
to IB = 100%
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debate length via the instrumental parameter M , which reinforces or weakens
the agent respective convictions. Larger M provides a tiny inflexible minority
with the power to convince a majority to shift opinion and get aligned along
the minority view.
More investigation could be of interest to determine more clearly the fact that
an agent influencing itself sounds as a good psychological description although it
appears illogical with respect the position of listening other arguments to make
up one’s won choice.
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